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Abstract—Bitcoin is a electronic payment system where pay-
ment transactions are verified and stored in a data structure
called the blockchain. Bitcoin miners work individually to solve
a computationally intensive problem, and with each solution
a Bitcoin block is generated, resulting in a new arrival to
the blockchain. The difficulty of the computational problem
is updated every 2,016 blocks in order to control the rate at
which blocks are generated. In the original Bitcoin paper, it
was suggested that the blockchain arrivals occur according to a
homogeneous Poisson process. Based on blockchain block arrival
data and stochastic analysis of the block arrival process, we
demonstrate that this is not the case. We present a refined
mathematical model for block arrivals, focusing on both the
block arrivals during a period of constant difficulty and how
the difficulty level evolves over time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin is an electronic currency and payment system which
allows for monetary transactions without a central authority.
Bitcoin was first proposed in a white paper [1] in 2008 by
the pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto, and as a functioning
open source software system in January 2009. Since then it
has grown rapidly and now has a market capitalisation of over
US$160 billion.
The stated benefits of Bitcoin relative to payment over
the Internet with traditional currencies include immutable
transactions, relative anonymity, freedom against seizure by
a central authority, faster and cheaper international currency
transfer, among others. The technology used in Bitcoin also
has potential to be applied to a wider range of applications
including identity management, distributed certification and
smart contracts.
Bitcoin employs a peer-to-peer network of nodes, computers
which verify, propagate and store information about bitcoin
transactions. Bitcoin maintains a global ledger of all Bitcoin
transactions ever conducted – the Bitcoin blockchain – dis-
tributed over the network of Bitcoin nodes. The problems of
maintaining and updating a global ledger without a trusted
central authority, while still allowing any owner of bitcoins
to spend them as they wish are solved by a series of crypto-
graphic techniques. The technique of central interest for this
paper is proof-of-work, whereby those who wish to contribute
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to building a consensus about which transactions are included
in the ledger must perform some computational “work”. This
work is referred to as Bitcoin mining.
Bitcoin users conduct transactions by cryptographically
signing messages, which identify who is to be debited, who is
to be credited, and where the change (if any) is to be deposited.
These messages are then propagated through the Bitcoin
network before being added to the blockchain. Each node in
the network keeps a list of valid outstanding transactions called
the transaction pool and passes it to neighbours in the network.
Before a transaction can be included in the blockchain, a new
block containing that transaction must be mined. A block is
a list of transactions, together with metadata including the
current time and a reference to the most recent previous
block in the blockchain (hence the name blockchain). A block
also includes a field called a nonce. The nonce contains no
information, so it can be freely varied in an attempt to find a
valid block that satisfies the requirements of the blockchain.
To find such a block and publish it to the bitcoin network is
referred to as mining a block.
A. Bitcoin mining
Mining is a race between all the Bitcoin miners to find
a valid block to append to the blockchain. To have a good
chance of winning this race requires substantial computational
resources, and the reward for doing so is a bounty of (currently
12.5) new bitcoins.
The requirements for a block to be valid are based on
Bitcoin’s hash function. In general, a hash function f maps a
string s (or equivalently, an integer, if the binary representation
of the string is interpreted as an integer in base 2) to another
string (integer) f(s), the hash of s. The key property of
the hash functions used in Bitcoin is that given any y in
the codomain of f it is computationally infeasible to find
any element of f−1(y). Furthermore, the hash functions are
designed such that any change in the input string s results
in a totally different output f(s). That is, f(s1) gives no
information about f(s2) if s1 6= s2, and so to calculate hashes
for a large number of input strings requires calculating each
hash separately. This property allows hashes to act as short,
tamper-proof summaries of large data files. Calculating the
hashes of large numbers of arguments s is the computational
work in Bitcoin’s proof-of-work.
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A Merkle tree is used to summarise and verify the integrity
of the transactions in a block.The Merkle tree is constructed
by recursively hashing pairs of transactions until there is only
one hash, called the Merkle root. The block header is formed
from the Merkle root, metadata (including the hash of the
previous block) and the nonce. For a block to be valid the
hash of the block header must be less than a certain value L,
referred to as the target. The hash of the candidate block is
calculated. In the rare case that the hash is less than the current
target L, the block is valid and is appended to the miner’s
blockchain: the block is said to have been mined. In the far
more likely case that the hash is not less than the current
target, the nonce is changed and the hash is recomputed. This
process is repeated (occasionally updating metadata or the list
of transactions) until some miner finds and publishes a block.
When a block is mined it is broadcast to all the other miners
who append the new block to their blockchains and resume
mining “on top of” the new block.
Bitcoin’s hash function maps Z+ ∪{0} to {0, 1, . . . , 2256−
1}. The computational difficulty in mining arises because
Bitcoin hashes are effectively uniformly distributed in the
interval (0, 2256 − 1) while the target L is much much less
than 2256. Consequently, the checking of a candidate block
is a Bernoulli trial with a probability of L/2256 of being
successful. By design, this probability is at most 2−32. The
trials are functionally independent, therefore the number of
hashes that need to be checked before a valid block is found is
a geometric random variable, with a very large mean, 2256/L
(≈ 6.2 × 1021 at the time of writing). On the other hand,
computers around the world are currently performing hash
function calculations at a very large rate (≈ 1019 hashes per
second at the time of writing). The time taken to mine a block
is therefore very well-modelled by an exponential random
variable. Furthermore, over any time interval where we can
take the rate of trials to be constant, the process whose events
are given by the instants at which blocks are mined should be
well-approximated by a Poisson process, with a rate given by
the product of the number of hashes H calculated per second
globally (the global hash rate), the value L of the target, and
a constant.
The success of the blockchain method has resulted in
Bitcoin becoming increasingly popular and inspiring other
electronic payment methods and other systems, such as online
education certification [2], that use blockchain mechanisms for
verification purposes. Indeed, although we will focus on the
Bitcoin blockchain, we point out that our analysis can apply
to other systems where similar blockchain policies are used.
B. Target (and difficulty) adjustment
The target L does not remain constant: it is adjusted every
2,016 blocks in an attempt to maintain an average mining
rate of 6 blocks per hour (2,016 blocks in 1,209,600 seconds)
despite changes in the amount of computational power being
used for mining. Let Xn be the time (in seconds) at which
the nth block is mined and define X0 = 0. Then the target
is adjusted at times X2016i for i = 1, 2, . . .. We call the time
between adjustments of the target a segment. Let the target in
the ith segment (X2016(i−1), X2016i) be Li. Then
Li+1 = Li(X2016i −X2016(i−1))/1209600 (1)
where L0 = 2224. If X2016i −X2016(i−1) is shorter than two
weeks, the target L is reduced proportionally, and the average
number of hashes checked to mine a block is increased,
slowing down mining. A common variable used instead of
the target is the difficulty D defined as
Di =
2224
Li
= Di−1
1209600
(X2016i −X2016(i−1) (2)
so that D0 = 1. The difficulty D is 232 times the average
number of hashes required to mine a block (see Equation (22)),
and denotes how much harder it is to mine a block than
with the original (maximum) target. This difficulty adjustment
is part of what makes the block arrival process for Bitcoin
interesting: the adjustment is a change in the block arrival
rate based on the random block arrival process itself, and the
adjustment also occurs at a random time.
C. Related work
Nakamoto [1] did not explicitly state that the blocks arrive
according to a homogeneous Poisson process. However, the
calculations in [1] are based on the assumption that the number
of blocks that an attacker, mining at rate λ1, mines in the
expected time z/λ2 that it takes for the community to mine
z blocks at rate λ2, is Poisson with parameter λ1z/λ2, which
is essentially equivalent to a Poisson process assumption.
Rosenfeld [3] pointed out that, under the assumption that
blocks arrive in a Poisson process, the number of blocks
created by an attacker in the time that it takes the community
to create a fixed number of blocks is a random variable with
a negative binomial distribution; see also [4, Section 1.4]
Rosenfeld also assumed that the block arrival process is a
Poisson process in [5] where he analysed reward structures for
pooled Bitcoin mining with a view to reducing the variance in
miner rewards while retaining fairness and preventing miners
from being incentivised to hop between pools. Lewenberg et
al. [6] also used a Poisson process model when they addressed
a similar problem, although unlike Rosenfeld they took a game
theory perspective and incorporated a constant, deterministic
value of the block propagation delay.
Eyal and Sirer [7] proposed an attack strategy called selfish-
mine, where certain dishonest miners keep discovered blocks
private in the hope that they can gain larger rewards than
honest miners. The majority of analysis on this topic has
explicitly or implicitly assumed a Poisson process model
for the block mining process, and typically used a Markov
chain model for the number of blocks mined by the selfish
mining pool and those mined by the rest of the miners.
Sapirshtein et al. [8] found the optimal strategy for performing
selfish mining. Go¨bel et al. [4] performed a stochastic and
simulation analysis of the selfish-mine strategy in the presence
of propagation delay.
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A Poisson process assumption for the block arrival process
has been used in other work. For example, Solat and Potop-
Butucaru [9] assumed a (homogeneous) Poisson process for
the block arrivals in their paper, where they developed a
timestamp-free method for combating attacks such as selfish-
mine, although this method does not crucially rely upon
the Poisson assumption. Decker and Wattenhofer assumed
a (homogeneous) Poisson process over periods where the
difficulty is constant in their analysis of the propagation of
transactions and blocks through the Bitcoin network [10].
Miller and LaViola[11] also assumed a Poisson process when
modelling the Bitcoin system as a means of reaching fault-
tolerant consensus.
D. The goal and structure of the paper
Despite the analyses mentioned in Section 1.3 above, there
has been little research to examine whether the block arrival
process in the Bitcoin blockchain actually does behave like a
homogeneous Poisson process.
The goal of this paper is to examine this assumption. It will
turn out that, at certain timescales, the block arrival process is
not Poisson, which will motivate us to propose refined point
process models for the block arrival process. We present a
suite of point process models for the block generation process,
suitable for viewing the process over a range of different
timescales. Over long timescales, this comes down to fitting
time-varying models to the hash rate. Over shorter timescales
we need to take into account the dependencies introduced by
the difficulty update mechanism and the fact that the hash rate
is varying within each segment while the difficulty remains
constant.
Our work here differs from previous modelling of the
Bitcoin blockchain because the difficulty adjustment is taken
into account, and we also examine the consequences of the
interaction between the block propagation delay and the hash
rate upon the blockchain process. We also infer miner-to-miner
propagation delay from the available block timestamp data.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II
we discuss the data available on the Bitcoin blockchain and
their limitations. In Section III we explain the drivers of the
global hash rate, and how to estimate the hash rate from
the available data. In Section IV we discuss several models
for the block arrival process, including how to approximate
the hash rate in order to allow more tractable analysis of
the desired model. We present results on the behaviour of
the Bitcoin system, and give a deterministic approximation.
Section V presents a summary of our various block arrival
models. Section VI presents the results of a simulation of the
Bitcoin blockchain. We summarise our results in Section VII.
II. THE BLOCK ARRIVAL PROCESS: THE DATA
Blocks arrive, that is, they are mined, published to the
bitcoin network and are added to the blockchain according
to a random process. Examining the block arrival process can
serve as a means of diagnosing the health of the blockchain,
as well as detecting the actions of malicious entities.
There are several ways in which we can define when a block
“arrives”. The two that are easiest to measure are:
1) the time when the block arrives at our measurement node
(or nodes), and
2) the timestamp encoded in the block header.
There are advantages and disadvantages associated with each
of these methods. We have forthcoming work on estimating the
distribution of errors in the arrival times from the combination
of both sources of data.
A. Block arrival times
The time when a block arrives at any given node in the
Bitcoin peer-to-peer network depends upon when the block
was mined and how the block propagates through the peer-
to-peer network. While propagation adds a random delay
component to the time when the block was mined, it also
represents when a block can truly be said to have arrived at the
node. Once a block has propagated through the network (and
to our measurement nodes), then the information contained
within the block is visible to to the miners and the users of
Bitcoin, and it is much less likely that any miner will mine on
top of a previous block and cause a conflict. However, a sub-
stantial problem with using block arrival times at measurement
nodes is that it is impossible to get historical information, or
information from periods when the measurement nodes were
not functioning, or not connected to the network.
B. Block timestamps
Using the timestamp in the block header as the authoritative
time has its own disadvantages. This time is determined from
the miner’s clock when the mining rig creates the block
template. If the miner’s clock is incorrect then this will
introduce an error. Timestamp errors are limited in magnitude:
blocks with timestamps prior to the median timestamp of the
previous 11 blocks, or more than 2 hours into the future are
rejected as being invalid and will not be propagated by the
network.
Nevertheless, block timestamp errors can be severe. For
example, of the 500,000 blocks mined up to November 2017,
13,618 of them have a timestamp prior to that of the previous
block and some 1,000 of them have timestamps more than 10
minutes prior to the previous block timestamp. If one considers
that a miner has access to the previous block (and hence the
timestamp of the previous block) before mining the next block,
these errors seem particularly anomalous1. This suggests that
some miners intentionally use inaccurate timestamps. One
potential reason for this is mining software that varies the
timestamp to use it as an additional nonce.2
Figure 1(a) shows a scatter plot of the magnitude of the
negative inter-arrival times versus the timestamp at which
1Out-of-order timestamps are often caused by a miner using a timestamp
from the future, and then miners for later blocks using a correct timestamp
that falls before the incorrect (future) one.
2 Miners can change both the nonce in the header and another nonce in
the coinbase transaction. These two nonces combined allow miners to cycle
through 296 hashes before modifying the timestamp.
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(a) Scatter plot of the sizes of the timestamp errors vs. when
they occurred. Out-of-order timestamps are prevalent throughout the
history of Bitcoin.
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(b) Histogram of the sizes of the timestamp errors. The local peak at
-1500 includes all pairs of adjacent blocks i, i+1 whose difference
in timestamps Xi+1 −Xi < −1500.
Figure 1: Known timestamp errors when timestamps for two
consecutive blocks in the blockchain are out of order.
they occurred. The horizontal axis covers the entire history
of Bitcoin. These errors are not localised to specific times in
history. Incorrect timestamps remain frequent even recently in
the blockchain.
Figure 1(b) shows a truncated histogram of the sizes of the
negative inter-arrival times. Some inter-arrival times are more
negative than −7, 000 seconds but most are between −1, 500
and 0 seconds.
We will later argue that while data for individual arrivals
are unreliable, our estimation of the hash rate is insensitive to
errors in the individual arrival times (especially if those errors
are independent) since it only relies upon the average rate of
arrival of large numbers of blocks.
C. Cleaning the data
Blockchain timestamps are recorded in whole numbers of
seconds since the 1st of January 1970, with the first block
being mined on the 3rd of January 2009. The first step we
took was to disregard all data prior to the 30th of December
2009. Owing to Bitcoin being newly adopted over 2009, the
block arrival process in this period had a large number of
anomalies, including one day in which no blocks were mined.
The next step was to deal with obvious errors. As discussed
in Section II-B, it is possible to have errors in the timestamps.
We know the order that the blocks must have been mined in,
because each block header contains the hash of the previous
block header. Let the timestamp of the ith block be Xi. Due to
errors, sometimes the timestamps are out of order: Xi > Xj
for some i < j. We call Ti := Xi−Xi−1 the ith inter-arrival
time, and if Ti is negative then there must have been an error.
Some of these errors are both substantial and obvious: for
instance if Xi − Xi−1 = 7162 and Xi+1 − Xi = −6603
while other nearby inter-arrival times are unremarkable, then
it would be sensible to assume that Xi is an error. However,
there are other cases that are more complicated to deal with.
There are several approaches that we considered.
1) Ignore: Ignore the fact that the data are out of order. If we
then look at the block inter-arrival times, some of these
will be negative. Also, some will be very large. If we are
studying the variance of the inter-arrival times then this
will be inflated relative to any of the methods discussed
below. Furthermore, the empirical distribution function
for inter-arrival times will not make physical sense, and
will certainly not be exponentially distributed.
2) Reorder: Sort the timestamps into ascending order. This
results in non-negative inter-arrival times, but we are
essentially removing random points and inserting them
elsewhere in the process. This has a far from obvious
effect, and the effect is dependent on the distribution of
these already unreliable timestamps.
3) Resample: Remove those timestamps which we deem
unreliable (by some criterion), then resample them uni-
formly in the interval between the adjacent times-
tamps that we consider reliable. For instance, say
Xi+1, Xi+2, Xi+3 are deemed unreliable but Xi and
Xi+4 are not. Then we would independently uniformly
sample three timestamps in the interval (Xi, Xi+4), sort
those new timestamps, and replace the previous val-
ues of Xi+1, Xi+2, Xi+3 by the three new timestamps.
This is essentially replacing the unreliable timestamps
with timestamps sampled from a Poisson process on
(Xi, Xi+4), conditional on there being three timestamps
in this interval. There are a few ways we can determine
which timestamps are unreliable:
a) Try to guess which timestamps are unreliable based on
the surrounding timestamps. It is not clear how to do
this, especially if we wish to do it empirically.
b) Declare any timestamp that is adjacent to a negative
inter-arrival time to be unreliable. That is, if Xi+1 −
Xi < 0, both Xi and Xi+1 are unreliable.
c) Sort the timestamps and consider any timestamp that
changes position when sorted to be unreliable. This
addresses the case of a single wrong timestamp the
same way as in (3b) and provides a consistent approach
for more complicated scenarios.
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Figure 2: An example of the effect of the resampling
scheme (3d) from Section II-C. The index i is the number
of blocks since 1 January 2009.
d) Find the longest increasing subsequence of the data
(if X1, X2, . . . is treated as a sequence). Such a
subsequence might not be unique. If there is more
than one longest increasing subsequence, then take
the intersection of all longest increasing subsequences.
Any timestamps not in this intersection are considered
unreliable.
Once the unreliable timestamps are determined, resample
them between the adjacent reliable timestamps.
To see why (3d) is reasonable, consider the case of having two
adjacent timestamps a long way out of order, see for instance
Figure 2: X1 < X2 < X5 < X6 < X7 < X8 < X3 < X4.
This is a scenario that actually occurs in the blockchain. Here
it is clear that X3 and X4 should be the timestamps under
suspicion, but (3b) will replace X4 and X5, and (3c) will
replace all of X3, . . . , X8, whereas (3d) replaces exactly X3
and X4. The algorithm for computing this is available at [12].
These are the steps we followed to clean the block arrival
time data:
• Disregarded all data prior to the 30th of December 2009.
• Performed (3d) for the rest of the data.
We refer to the data after these two steps as LR (later,
resampled). Of the 464,372 blocks after the 30th of December
2009, 441,225 or 95% of them are in every longest increasing
subsequence. The remaining 5% were resampled. While the
longest increasing subsequences span the whole length of
the blockchain, the errors that are corrected by taking the
intersection of all longest increasing subsequences are all of
a local nature. Most of those timestamps that were resampled
were in consecutive groups of 1, 2 or 3. Two consecutive
timestamps being resampled was the most common: this oc-
curs when one timestamp is incorrect but with a small enough
error to be only one place out of order. The other timestamp
that it is transposed with will also be considered unreliable
and resampled. An isolated timestamp being resampled is
caused by that timestamp having a particularly large error. If a
timestamp has a large error it can have two or more timestamps
between its observed value and its correct value. In this case,
if none of the other nearby timestamps are out of order the
incorrect timestamp will be the only one resampled.
We provide this data (along with annotation as to which
points have been resampled) at [12]. We suggest that this
sequence could serve as a reference version of cleaned
blockchain timestamp data for other research on this topic.
III. ESTIMATING THE GLOBAL HASH RATE
The global hash rate H(t) is a key factor driving the
block arrival process. It is the total processing power (hashes
calculated per second) that all the Bitcoin miners in the world
are dedicating to mining at time t. In the long term, H(t)
is largely increasing exponentially in a Moore’s Law fashion.
The main drivers of change in the hash rate are:
1) Miners switching new machines on. This typically in-
volves ordering mining machines from one of a small
number of ASIC manufacturers, often while those ASICs
are still in development, and waiting for the manufacturer
(who is prone to delays) to manufacture and ship the
ASICs in batches. Then the ASICs arrive at the miners
and they install them and switch them on and start
mining. Each generation of new mining machines is faster
than the last, although this increase is not steady, even in
an exponential sense. It is widely believed that the rate
of increase in the hash rate is petering out now.
2) Mining machines becoming uneconomical because of
increasing electricity prices, increasing global hash rates,
reduced bitcoin prices, or halving3 of the mining reward,
and being switched off.
3) Mining machines becoming more economical due to
both to technological advancements and, at times, the
increasing value of bitcoins, and when electricity prices
are reduced.
A. Empirical estimates for the global hash rate
The global hash rate H(t) cannot be measured directly.
However, the difficulty Di is recorded in the header of every
block. Equations (1) and (2) can be combined to give
Di+1 =
1209600Di
X2016i −X2016(i−1) . (3)
The ratio 2016/(X2016i − X2016(i−1)) is the average rate of
block discovery in the period [X2016i, X2016(i−1)), and 232Di
is the expected number of hashes that must be checked to
find a valid solution when the difficulty is Di. A reasonable
estimate Ĥi for the average of the global hash rate H(t) over
the segment (X2016i, X2016(i−1)) is therefore given by the
product of those two quantities, namely
Ĥi =
2016× 232Di
X2016i −X2016(i−1) =
232
600
Di+1. (4)
3The Bitcoin mining reward is halved every 210,000 blocks mined. The
coin reward will decrease from 12.5 to 6.25 bitcoins around June 2020.
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Figure 3: Plot of the difficulty over the life of the blockchain.
This serves as an estimate of a constant multiple of the global
hash rate.
Thus we can get a sense of how the hash rate has changed
over time by examining the graph of the difficulty over time
presented in Figure 3.
We can refine this approach to obtain a sliding window
estimate HWk,i of the hash rate, with the window being fixed
at k blocks long, centred around the ith block.
HWk,i =
232
Xdi+k/2e −Xdi−k/2e
di−k/2e∑
j=di+k/2e
Ddj/2016e. (5)
If there was no difficulty change between Xdi+k/2e and
Xdi−k/2e, then
HWk,i =
232Ddi/2016ek
Xdi+k/2e −Xdi−k/2e . (6)
We can consider HWk,i to be an estimate of H(t) at times
ti = (Xdi+k/2e +Xdi−k/2e)/2. To get a continuous estimator
we can linearly interpolate between these points to get HWk (t)
for t ≥ Xk/2.
The estimation of H(t) from Equation (5) is not without
its problems due to the stochastic nature of the block arrival
process, and inaccuracies in the values of the block timestamps
Xi. If the window k is longer, there is less stochastic variation
in the estimate, but the time resolution of the resulting estimate
of H(t) is lower so that it is more difficult to pick up short-
term fluctuations in H(t), yielding the standard bias/variance
trade-off when performing smoothing. Note that regardless of
what window we use, the time resolution of the estimate will
be limited by the frequency of block arrivals, and the noise
caused by the stochastic variation inherent in the process.
Another method for estimating H(t) via smoothing the
block arrival data is by using a method essentially equivalent
to weighted kernel density estimation (KDE), but without
the requirement that the output is a density. For each block
i = 1, 2, . . . we centre a kernel K(x) at the measured
time Xi of the arrival of the block, and weight it with
wi = 2
32Ddi/2016e where wi is the number of hashes that
must be checked on average to mine a block with the same
difficulty as block i. The kernel estimator is given by
HKh (t) =
1
h
∑
i
wiK((t−Xi)/h)
=
232
h
∑
i
Ddi/2016eK((t−Xi)/h). (7)
Some examples of appropriate kernel functions are the rectan-
gular function K(x) = 121|x|<1, the normal density function
1√
2pi
e−x
2/2, and the Epanechnikov kernel [13] 34 (1−x2)1|x|<1.
Here h is referred to as the bandwidth of the kernel estimator.
The bandwidth h performs a role similar to that of the window
size k above, so the value of h is important. If h is too
small then the data has spurious variability from measurement
error (and more substantially, from the stochastic variability
of block discoveries). If h is too large then the data will be
oversmoothed and fail to capture true short-term variability in
H(t). However, we are primarily interested in the long term
behaviour of H(t), so our conclusions later in the paper are
relatively insensitive to which estimate for H(t) we use, the
kernel function K(x) and the window size k or the bandwidth
h.
Figure 4 shows a comparison of HW144(t), H
W
2016(t),
HK1 day(t), H
K
2 weeks(t) and H
K
6 months(t) over the life of the
Bitcoin blockchain where K denotes the Epanechnikov kernel.
At this scale it is difficult to distinguish between HW2016(t)
and HK2 weeks(t). The more smoothed kernel-based estimate
(h = 6 months) appears to lead the other estimates because
the rapid increase in the hash rate is dispersed by the width
of the kernel into the time before it has truly happened. This
makes the smoother (higher bandwidth) estimate misleading
and we will use a lower bandwidth estimate for the remainder
of the paper. The behaviour of the blockchain in the first 50
weeks is erratic.
B. Intervals of exponential growth in the global hash rate
By inspecting the plot of an estimate of the hash rate from
2009 to 2017 (Figure 4) we see that the logarithm of the
global hash rate is approximately linear for long periods, that
is, the hash rate is increasing exponentially. We approximate
the global hash rate H(t) by eat+b on intervals where it can be
estimated that a and b remain constant. In Figure 5 we partition
the history of the blockchain into such periods, and for each
of these periods we fit a linear function to log(HW144(t)) using
standard linear regression. The values for this fit are given in
Table I.
The assumption of exponential growth in the hash rate is
natural for two reasons. First, the increase in Bitcoin mining
power is partially driven by technological developments: the
processors used in mining have become increasingly cost-
and energy-efficient over time in a manner reminiscent of
Moore’s Law. Second, we observe in the actual blockchain
that the average time taken for a segment is consistently
under 2 weeks. If we want the average time taken for a
segment to be stationary with a mean not equal to 2 weeks
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Figure 4: Estimates of the hash rate HW2016(t), H
W
144(t),
HK1 day(t), H
K
2 weeks(t) and H
K
6 months(t) respectively from
January 2009 to April 2017. The sliding window estimate with
k = 2016 is not identical to the kernel-based estimate with
h = 2 weeks, but it is almost indistinguishable at this scale,
so the two curves overlay and only one of them is visible on
the graph.
then H(t) is required to grow exponentially. Intuitively, if
the time taken for each segment was roughly constant at a
value of T2016, then the difficulty D(t) would increase by
a factor of (2 weeks)/T2016 each segment, and since the
difficulty is increasing exponentially, the hash rate would also
have to increase exponentially to maintain constant segment
time. Approximating log(H(t)) with a linear function also has
the benefit of tractability for modelling and analysis.
We can calculate the limiting average for segment times
by recognizing that the average change in the difficulty of
successive segments is cancelled out by the growth in the hash
rate over the duration of each segment. The faster the increase
in the hash rate, the lower the limiting average inter-arrival
time.
Let Ĥ(t) = eat+b. Then the multiplicative growth in hash
rate over a segment of duration T2016 is eaT2016 . The ratio
of the new difficulty to the previous difficulty, given by
Equation (3), is (2 weeks)/T2016. In seconds, this gives
the relationship between the average time taken to mine a
segment and the slope of the logarithm of the hash rate (see
interval start end a b
1 3 Jan 2009 30 Dec 2009 −9.44× 10−9 27.1
2 30 Dec 2009 13 Jul 2010 2.18× 10−7 -259
3 13 Jul 2010 24 Jun 2011 2.72× 10−7 -326
4 24 Jun 2011 1 Mar 2013 2.01× 10−8 3.38
5 1 Mar 2013 9 Oct 2014 1.96× 10−7 -236
6 9 Oct 2014 24 Nov 2017 3.88× 10−8 -15.1
Table I: The parameters of the piecewise exponential hash rate
Ĥ(t) = eat+b in each interval, with t in seconds. Each interval
starts and ends on a segment boundary.
Equation (35))
eaT2016 = 1209600/T2016 (8)
or equivalently,
a =
1
T2016
log (1209600/T2016) . (9)
Note that the long-term average time to mine a block is
T2016/2016, although the average inter-arrival time decreases
over the course of each segment as shown in Figure 7 below.
This means that the long-term average time to mine a block
Tave when the hash rate is H(t) = eat+b is given by solving
the relationship
e2016aTave = 600/Tave. (10)
We simulated the arrival of 40,000 blocks with random
difficulty changes (exponential hash rate function, no block
propagation delay) using a range of values of a. Figure 6 shows
that the long term average block inter-arrival time agrees with
Equations (8) through (10). Further, we also plot the average
inter-arrival time of the observed blockchain timestamp data
for each of the intervals in Table I versus the fitted value of a
for each interval. Figure 6 shows that the observed data also
fits the predicted relationship in Equation (8). We provide a
theoretical basis for Equation (8) in Section IV-D2.
IV. IS THE BLOCK ARRIVAL PROCESS A POISSON
PROCESS?
A. Poisson processes
A point process N is a Poisson point process on R if it has
the following two properties [14, Chapter 2.4].
1) The random number of points N([a, b)) of the point
process N located in a bounded interval [a, b) ⊂ R is
a Poisson random variable with mean Λ([a, b)), where Λ
is a non-negative Radon measure.
2) The numbers of points of the point process N
located in k intervals [a1, b1), . . . , [ak, bk) form k
independent Poisson random variables with means
Λ([a1, b1)), . . . ,Λ([ak, bk)).
From now on we will write N([a, b)) as N(a, b) and
Λ([a, b)) = Λ(a, b) for convenience. The first property implies
that
P(N(a, b) = n) =
Λ(a, b)ne−Λ(a,b)
n!
, (11)
and E[N(a, b)] = Λ(a, b), while the second property is the
principal reason for the tractability of the Poisson point process
and it is usually the basis of statistical tests that measure
the suitability of Poisson models. The Poisson distribution of
N(a, b) implies its variance is Var[N(a, b)] = Λ(a, b), a fact
that is also used as a statistical test.
The measure Λ is known as the intensity measure or mean
measure of the Poisson point process. We will assume that a
function λ(t) exists such that
Λ(a, b) =
∫ b
a
λ(t)dt. (12)
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Figure 5: Linear fits to HW144(t) over a sequence of six intervals, with the endpoints of the intervals given in Table I. A closer
view of the fitted hash rate Ĥ(t) = eat+b and a more fine-grained estimate of the hash rate HW144(t) over the intervals is given
in subfigures (b) through (f).
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Figure 6: The relationship between the inter-arrival time and
a, the slope of the logarithm of the hash rate over time, in
theory, simulations and observations. The global hash rate at
time t is modelled by Ĥ(t) = eat+b. The system reaches a
steady state where the average time Tave for a block to arrive
is related to a by Equation (10). The simulated values are
given by a simulation of 40,000 blocks with exponential hash
rate, random difficulty changes and no propagation delay. The
observed values of the average inter-arrival time are calculated
from the observed timestamps for each interval, and the values
of a are the fitted values given in Table I. The segment time is
2016 times the average block inter-arrival time for the relevant
interval.
Then λ(t) is known as a rate function. If λ(t) is a constant
λ > 0 then the point process is called a homogeneous
Poisson point process. Otherwise, the point process is called
an nonhomogeneous or inhomogeneous Poisson point pro-
cess. Restricting our attention to the interval of non-negative
numbers [0,∞), the intensity measure is given by
Λ(t) := Λ([0, t)) =
∫ t
0
λ(t)dt, (13)
For a Poisson process N with intensity measure Λ, the
probability of n points existing in the interval [a, b) is
P(N(a, b) = n) =
[Λ(b)− Λ(a)]ne−[Λ(b)−Λ(a)]
n!
. (14)
1) Arrival times and inter-arrival times: Consider a point
process {X(i)}i≥1 defined on the non-negative reals with an
almost certainly finite number of points in any bounded inter-
val. Then we can interpret the points of the process as arrival
times and put them in increasing order, X1 ≤ X2 ≤ . . .. Then
the distances between adjacent points are Ti := Xi − Xi−1
for i = 2, 3, . . . and T1 = X1. The random variables Ti are
known as waiting or inter-arrival times. For a homogeneous
Poisson process with rate λ, the corresponding inter-arrival
times are independent and identically-distributed exponential
random variables with mean 1/λ
P(Tk ≤ t) = 1− e−λt, (15)
where the memoryless property of the exponential distribution
has been used. This is not the case for an inhomogeneous
Poisson point process with intensity λ(t), where the first inter-
arrival time T1 = X1 has the distribution
P(T1 ≤ t1) = 1− e−
∫ t1
0 λ(s)ds. (16)
Given the first waiting time T1 = t1, the conditional distribu-
tion of the second waiting time T2 is
P(T2 ≤ t2|T1 ≤ t1) = 1− e−
∫ t2
t1
λ(s)ds , (17)
and so on for k ≥ 2,
P(Tk ≤ tk|Tk−1 ≤ tk−1) = 1− e−
∫ tk
tk−1 λ(s)ds . (18)
It can be shown that the kth arrival time Xk has the distribution
P(Xk ≤ t) = e−Λ(t)
∞∑
n=k
Λ(t)k
k!
, (19)
with density
fXk(t) =
λ(x)Λ(t)k−1
(k − 1)! e
−Λ(t) . (20)
Condition on n points {Ui}ni=1 of a Poisson process existing in
some bounded interval [0, t]. We call these points conditional
arrival times. If the Poisson process is homogeneous, then
the conditional arrival times are uniformly and independently
distributed, forming n uniform random variables on [0, t]. This
difference between waiting times Ti and conditional arrival
times Ui plays a role in a Poisson test, originally proposed by
Brown et al. [15] and later examined in detail by Kim and
Whitt [16].
For a nonhomogeneous Poisson process, each point Ui
is independently distributed on the interval [0, t] with the
distribution
P(Ui ≤ u) = Λ(u)
Λ(t)
, u ∈ [0, t]. (21)
If the distribution of each Ui is known and invertible, then
each Ui can be transformed into a uniform random variable
on [0, 1], resulting in n independent uniform random vari-
ables. In other words, Λ(t) maps a Poisson process to a
homogeneous Poisson process with density one on the real
line. Consequently, statistical methods for nonhomogeneous
Poisson processes often involve transforming the data, before
performing the analysis.
The monograph by Kingman [17] is recommended for
background reading on the Poisson point process. Interpreted
as a stochastic process, standard books on stochastic processes
cover the Poisson process. The papers by Brown et al. [15] and
Kim and Whitt [16] are good starting points to get up-to-date
on methods for fitting nonhomogeneous Poisson processes and
tests for Poissonness in the one-dimensional setting.
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B. Block arrivals modelled as a homogeneous Poisson process
with rate six blocks per hour
At first glance, a Poisson process appears to be a reasonable
model for block arrivals, see Section I-A.
The simplest model is that the blocks arrive at the instants
of a homogeneous Poisson process with an arrival rate equal
to the designed rate of six blocks per hour. However, the
empirical average since Bitcoin began has been 6.4 blocks per
hour over hundreds of thousands of blocks, almost certainly
indicating that the hypothesised parameter of six blocks per
hour is incorrect.
A possible reason for this is that the hash rate is generally
increasing over time, and the method by which the difficulty
is updated means that the difficulty lags behind the hash rate
by about two weeks. Consequently, the average rate at which
blocks are mined is greater than six blocks per hour due to the
delay in adjusting the difficulty. Furthermore, the hash rate and
hence the block arrival rate usually increases over the course
of a segment until the end of the segment when the difficulty
is increased to compensate, and the arrival rate is reduced.
Figure 7 shows the average block inter-arrival time versus
the number of blocks since the last difficulty change for the
second to sixth intervals depicted in Figure 5, see also Table I.
Figures 7(a), 7(b) and 7(d) show that when the hash rate is
increasing rapidly the average inter-arrival time decreases as
the segment of 2,016 blocks progresses. Figures 7(c) and 7(e)
show that when the hash rate is increasing slowly the average
inter-arrival time decreases slightly as the segment of 2,016
blocks progresses.
C. Block arrivals modelled as a homogeneous Poisson process
with any rate
The next simplest model is a homogeneous Poisson process
with an arrival rate equal to the empirical average block arrival
rate.
A key characteristic of a homogeneous Poisson process is
that the times between arrivals Ti are independently expo-
nentially distributed with identical mean, see Equation (15).
We can test this hypothesis using the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff
test (K-S test). This test uses sup |Fn(x) − F (x)| as the test
statistic, where Fn(x) is the empirical cumulative distribution
function of the n data points, and F (x) is the true distribution.
The Lilliefors test [18] allows us to apply the K-S test if we
do not know the mean of the true distribution.
Performing the Lilliefors test on the LR data rejects the
null hypothesis that block mining intervals are exponentially
distributed, at a significance level of α = 0.05. In fact, the
p-value for the test is less than 0.001, the smallest reportable
p-value for the test when performed in MATLAB. Thus we
can be very confident that the LR data are not generated by a
homogeneous Poisson process4.
Furthermore, we know the process is not Poisson due to the
dependence between disjoint intervals inherent in the design
4Note that the uncleaned timestamp data are obviously not generated by a
homogeneous Poisson process since the mean and standard deviation of the
inter-arrival data are significantly different.
of the difficulty adjustments: the time taken for a segment is
random, which determines the difficulty for the next segment,
and that difficulty influences the rate of block arrivals over
that segment (Equation (2)).
We can examine the distribution function of the inter-
arrival times to try to see what is happening. Figure 8 shows
a comparison between the empirical survivor function (the
difference between the empirical distribution function and one)
for our inter-arrival time data and the survivor function for
an exponential random variable with the same mean on a
logarithmically scaled plot. We can see that a few abnormally
large inter-arrival times Xi+1−Xi are hindering the agreement
between the empirical distribution function and the exponential
distribution. If we resample all inter-arrival times that are
greater than 6500 as exponential random variables conditioned
to be greater than 6500, then the agreement is closer but the
Lilliefors test still has p-value less than 0.001.
D. Block arrivals modelled as a piecewise combination of
nonhomogeneous Poisson processes
A natural way to account for the global hash rate changing
over time is to use a nonhomogeneous Poisson process to
model the block discovery rate. The instantaneous rate at
which blocks are discovered is
λ(t) =
H(t)
232D(t)
. (22)
To simulate such a process, we start with a form for the
function H(t), for example the model defined in Section III-B
or the empirical process. Then for each segment of 2,016
blocks:
1) Calculate D(t) for the current segment from the previous
difficulty and the time taken for the previous segment.
2) Calculate λ(t) from H(t), D(t) and Equation (22).
3) Simulate the 2,016 block discovery times for the segment
according to a nonhomogeneous Poisson process with
rate λ(t).
This is not a Poisson process over a timescale spanning
successive segments because the block arrival rate depends
on the time of the first and last block arrival in the previous
segment.
1) Distributions for the time of arrival of the nth block
in a segment: To model a piecewise combination of nonho-
mogeneous Poisson processes we will start by examining the
behaviour of the block arrival process within a segment, where
the difficulty remains constant.
Let the random variable Xn be the time of the nth point
of an nonhomogeneous Poisson process with rate λ(t) and
cumulative intensity function Λ(t). The distribution function
of each random variable Xn is given by Equation (19) and
its density is given by Equation (20). For some choices of
λ(t) we can simplify the density function, and also calculate
E[Xn]. For example, if λ(t) = at then
fXn|X0=0(x) = axe
−ax2/2(ax2/2)n−1
1
(n− 1)! , (23)
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Figure 7: The average block inter-arrival times vs. the number of blocks since the last difficulty change.
and
E[Xn] =
√
2pi
a
(
2n− 2
n− 1
)
1
2n− 2 . (24)
If instead λ(t) = eat then for 1 ≤ n ≤ 2016
fXn|X0=0(x) = e
axe−(e
ax−1)/a((eax − 1)/a)n−1 1
(n− 1)! ,
and for a 6= 0
E[Xn|X0 = 0] =
n−1∑
i=0
(−a)−i (25)
=
(
−e1/a
i!a Ei(−1/a) +
∑i
j=1
(−a)j
j(i−j)!
∑j−1
k=0
a−1−k
k!
)
, (26)
where Ei(x) is the Exponential Integral Ei(x) =
− ∫∞−x e−t/t dt. See Appendix A for a proof of Equation (25).
Note that while Equation (25) is not defined for a = 0, the
limit as a → 0+ of Equation (25) is n, the value for a rate
one homogeneous Poisson process as expected.
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Figure 8: Comparison of the survivor function (1−F (x)) for
the empirical LR data and an exponential distribution on a log
axis.
Equation (25) is easy to compute for small values of n, but
for larger values of n (and small values of a) direct evaluation
becomes unmanageable. Instead of considering the expected
time of the nth arrival, another approach would be to find the
time at which the expected number of arrivals was equal to n
by inverting the relationship Λ(t) = n, which we use in the
following subsection.
2) A deterministic approximation for the segment times:
We now address the question of what happens over successive
segments when difficulty adjustments are taken into account.
We approximate E[Xn] with the time zn at which the expected
number of blocks that have arrived is n, which is defined by
the relation
n =
∫ zn
X0
λ(t) dt , (27)
where λ(t) = H(t)/(232D(t)). If X0 = 0 we have zn =
Λ−1(n). We have reason to believe that this is a good ap-
proximation over one segment, especially for the λ(t) that we
consider. For example, Figure 9 shows a comparison between
E[Xn] and zn on a single segment where λ(t) = eat with
a = 0.1. In the case of Bitcoin, a is typically much smaller (see
Table I), which increases the accuracy of the approximation.
The results above for E[Xn] and zn are for single segments
only, we have not included the dependency caused by changes
in the difficulty. Now we investigate the behaviour of the times
at which difficulty changes occur. While these are random
variables, we approximate them with a deterministic version
yn: the times such that the average number of arrivals since
the last difficulty change is 2,016, that is, for n ≥ 1
2016 =
∫ yn
yn−1
λ(t) dt =
∫ yn
yn−1
H(t)
232D(t)
dt =
∫ yn
yn−1
H(t)
232Dn
dt.
(28)
We fix H(t) and the starting difficulty D1 = d1 ≥ 1, and
determine each subsequent difficulty change as in the random
version, but instead of using the random arrival times to adjust
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Figure 9: Comparison of E[Xn], the expected time that the nth
block arrives, with zn, the time at which the expected number
of blocks arrived is n, for λ(t) = eat with a = 0.1.
the difficulty, we use the deterministic approximation. The
difficulty on (yn, yn+1) is then given by
dn+1 = dn
2 weeks
yn − yn−1 , (29)
for n ≥ 1.
Let δn = yn − yn−1, and thus yn = y0 +
∑n
i=1 δi and use
fortnights (2 weeks) as our unit of time. We have for n ≥ 2
dn = dn−1/δn−1 = d1/
n−1∏
i=1
δi . (30)
If we assume an exponential hash rate Ĥ(t) = eat+b with
a > 0 we can use Equation (28) to find a recursion for the
sequence (δn)∞n=2
2016 =
∫ yn
yn−1
eat+b
dn
dt =
eb
adn
(eayn − eayn−1)
=
eayn−1+b
adn
(eaδn − 1) (31)
so that
eaδn − 1 = ad1/
∏n−1
i=1 δi
exp(ay0 + b+ a
∑n−1
i=1 δi)
=
ad1/
∏n−2
i=1 δi
b exp(ay0 + a
∑n−2
i=1 δi)
· 1
eaδn−1δn−1
=
eaδn−1 − 1
eaδn−1δn−1
. (32)
Thus
δn =
1
a
log
(
eaδn−1 − 1
eaδn−1δn−1
+ 1
)
. (33)
Consider the sequence An = (eaδn − 1)∞n=1. Equation (32)
shows that
An = An−1/(eaδn−1δn−1).
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Thus if δ∗ = limn→∞ δn exists, then limn→∞An = 0 or δ∗
satisfies
eaδ
∗
δ∗ = 1 (34)
which is consistent with Equation (8). However,
limn→∞An = 0 implies that limn→∞ δn = 0, but
limδn−1→0An−1/(e
aδn−1δn−1) = a, a contradiction. Thus
we have shown that if δ∗ exists then it must satisfy
Equation (34).
An alternative means of expressing Equation (34) is
δ∗ =
1
a
W (a) (35)
where W (·) is the Lambert-W function [19], [20], defined so
that x = W (xex). We now show that δ∗ = limn→∞ δn exists.
Consider the function f(δ) = 1a log
(
eaδ−1
eaδδ
+ 1
)
, defined
so that δn+1 = f(δn). We will show that f (n)(δ1) tends to a
limit regardless of δ1 > 0. Taking the derivative,
f ′(δ) =
aδ − eaδ + 1
aδ((δ + 1)eaδ − 1) . (36)
Then f ′(δ) is increasing from −a2(1+a) to 0 as δ goes from 0
to ∞, thus − 12 < −a2(1+a) < f ′(δ) < 0 and consequently f(δ)
is a contraction for δ ∈ (0,∞). Therefore, by the Banach
fixed point theorem, we know that δ∗ = limn→∞ f (n)(δ1) =
limn→∞ δn exists and satisfies f(δ) = δ, and thus it is given
by the unique solution of Equation (34).
Equation (34) has the following interpretation: if a steady
state is to occur, the ratio eaδ by which the hash rate in-
creases over the period of a segment should be equal to the
corresponding increase in the difficulty. This increase in the
difficulty is given by the ratio 1/δ of a fortnight to the actual
time taken for the segment. In the case of this deterministic
approximation, the system settles down to a steady state
regardless of initial conditions.
We can use this deterministic approximation for the times
and magnitudes of the difficulty changes as the basis of
a nonhomogeneous Poisson process model over a timescale
spanning successive segments. In such a model the difficulty
changes are now deterministic, and so there is no dependency
on disjoint intervals to prevent the block arrival process from
being Poisson.
E. Including the block propagation delay in the block arrival
model
Our model does not yet account for the time taken for a
newly discovered block to propagate through the network and
have its transactions validated at each node. While this affects
the times that blocks arrive at a measurement node, it does
not directly change the timestamps of the blocks. However, it
does affect the block inter-arrival process as a whole. When
a new block is mined, it has to propagate through the Bitcoin
network to each other miner and be validated before that miner
can start mining on it5. Block propagation delay thus has an
5Sometimes miners will speed up the process by mining blocks while
waiting for transaction validation to be completed.
effect on the rate at which mining is performed. We will use
a simple method for modelling the delay: we treat it as an
effective reduction in the block arrival rate for a period after
a block is mined. We provide two options:
1) The simplest option is to model it as a constant delay to
every miner, and ignore the hash power contribution from
the miner of the block (who sees no propagation delay).
Thus we would take any of our previous models and add
a period after each block arrival when no blocks could
be mined.
2) The second option is to assume that the block does not
arrive at all nodes at once, but gradually reaches a greater
and greater proportion of the miners (or more importantly,
a greater and greater proportion of the mining power).
If we assume that the rate at which miners receive the
block is proportional to the number of miners who have
not yet received it, we obtain an exponential model for
the delay. In this case, if the most recent block arrived
at time s, then the effective global hash rate at time t is
(1− ec(t−s))H(t).
This approach is consistent with the way in which [10]
and [21] refer to propagation delay: they quantify it in
each case by saying “on average a block will arrive at
90% of nodes within x seconds”, where x is 26 and 79
respectively6.
We examine the consequences of this approach in more
detail in the following section. In the simulation experiments
presented in Section VI we will only consider option 2.
V. SUMMARY OF THE BLOCK ARRIVAL MODELS
There are several aspects of the block arrival models pro-
posed in this paper. We provide a summary of these differing
options here before using a simulation to evaluate them in the
following section.
1) The hash rate function can be modelled 1(a) parametri-
cally, or 1(b) empirically.
We will use Ĥ(t) = eat+b as the parametric hash rate
model and HW144(t) as the empirical hash rate model.
2) The difficulty adjustments are 2(a) deterministic, or
2(b) random.
The real blockchain has random difficulty adjustments, in
that they occur every 2,016 blocks of a random process,
and their magnitude depends on the time those blocks
took to arrive. However, we saw in Section IV-D2 that
given the hash rate function, we can find the expected
times and magnitudes of these difficulty adjustments, and
use those instead to approximate the block arrival process.
3) The 3(a) absence, or 3(b) presence of block propagation
delay and how the delay is modelled (Section IV-E).
6The values given for median and 90% block propagation times in [10]
are approximately consistent with exponential delay, but those given in [21]
do not exactly fit an exponential distribution for delay. This might be due
to some nodes having much higher bandwidth and connectivity than others
in the network. Also, these figures are only for node-to-node communication
rather than miner-to-miner.
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Regardless of whether the global hash rate H(t) is modelled
empirically or parametrically, for each of the block arrival
models in this paper the hash rate is determined before the
random process Xi(t) is sampled.
• For the models 2(a) with deterministic difficulty adjust-
ments, the difficulty is adjusted at deterministic time
instants yn which do not correspond to the random
instants of block arrivals, and the block arrival rate λ(t)
is independent of the block arrivals in the preceeding
segments. If there is no delay 3(a), then on each interval
the model is a nonhomogeneous Poisson process.
• For the models 2(b) with random difficulty adjustment,
the difficulty is adjusted at random time instants cor-
responding to the end of each 2,016 block segment
using Equation (1). If there is no delay 3(a), then on
each segment the process is a nonhomogeneous Poisson
process with rate given by λ(t) = H(t)/Di. Since the
block arrival rate λ(t) depends upon the first and last
arrivals in the previous segment, the process is not a
Poisson process over a timescale spanning successive
segments.
• If propagation delay is present 3(b), then the block arrival
process is not a nonhomogeneous Poisson process even
on a single segment.
In the following section we will compare simulations of these
models to the timestamp data from the Bitcoin blockchain.
VI. SIMULATIONS AND COMPARISON WITH BLOCKCHAIN
DATA
A. Exponential hash rate, random difficulty changes, no block
propagation delay
We approximate the hash rate H(t) with an exponential
function Ĥ(t) = eat+b. The block arrival rate is λ(t) =
Ĥ(t)/(232D(t)) as in Equation (22), where the difficulty D(t)
changes every 2,016 blocks as in Equation (1). We developed
two independent implementations of the simulation model.
The outputs of the two simulators agreed closely. The average
results for each interval are given in Table II. While the
estimate HW144(t) of the real hash rate fluctuates around the
exponential approximation Ĥ(t) (see Figure 5), the average
block inter-arrival time in each interval closely matches the
observed mean with the exception of interval 5 from March
2013 to October 2014.
We can also see (Figure 6) that the mean inter-arrival
time from the simulations closely matches the mean predicted
by the steady state approximation given in Equation (35)
regardless of the value of the exponential coefficient a.
B. Modifications for simulating the block propagation delay
When simulating our models with propagation delay, we
must take into account the effect of that delay on the apparent
hash rate, and re-estimate the hash rate taking the (hypothe-
sised) value of the delay into account. Let the estimate of the
underlying hash rate (the number of hashes being checked per
second, valid or otherwise) be Ĥ(t) and the effective hash rate
be H˜(t) = (1− ec(t−s))Ĥ(t).
interval 2 3 4 5 6
Observed mean 491.8 459.1 586.9 503.2 575.7
Simulated mean 491.6 462.6 589.2 493.8 576.9
Observed s.d. 503.3 477.6 578.1 494.7 567.3
Simulated s.d. 493.7 465.6 589.7 494.7 578.0
Table II: Simulation experiments using an exponential hash
rate function, random difficulty changes and zero block prop-
agation delay: the mean and standard deviation of the block
inter-arrival times in seconds for each interval.
If we assume an exponential hash rate function Ĥ(t) =
eat+b with random difficulty changes, then for the period
between Xi and Xi+1, the number of effective hashes checked
is∫ Xi+1
Xi
H˜(t) dt
=
∫ Xi+1
Xi
(1− ec(t−Xi))Ĥ(t) dt
=
∫ Xi+1
Xi
(1− ec(t−Xi))eat+b dt
= eaXi+b
∫ Xi+1−Xi
0
(eat − e(a+c)t) dt
= Ĥ(Xi)
[
eat
a
− e
(c+a)t
c+ a
]Xi+1−Xi
0
= Ĥ(Xi)
(
ea(Xi+1−Xi) − 1
a
− e
(a+c)(Xi+1−Xi) − 1
a+ c
)
.(37)
If we approximate the Xi by their measured values we can
invert this relationship to obtain a corrected estimate for H(t)
in the exponential case. The process is similar if we use an
empirical hash rate function.
If we want to simulate a model with deterministic difficulty
changes, we must employ a slightly more complicated version
of this process to estimate the times at which difficulty changes
occur. This is because the arrival rate is not constant over the
interval. The adjusted arrival rate λ˜(t) is given by
λ˜(t) =
λ(t)
1 + λ(t)/c
=
1
1/λ(t) + 1/c
(38)
where λ(t) = H(t)/(232D(t)). Thus we must solve for
yi+1 = X2016(i+1) in ∫ yi+1
yi
λ˜(t)dt (39)
iteratively for each i to get the expected difficulty change times
yi+1.
C. Discrepancies between the observed and simulated values
of the standard deviation of the inter-arrival times
Table II shows that the average block inter-arrival time of the
observed data and the simulation using the random difficulty
change model match reasonably well in all the intervals except
interval 5 from March 2013 to October 2014, but the standard
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deviation of the simulated data often does not match well with
the observed data. There are two possible reasons for this.
• The first reason is the error in the block arrival times. Let
Xi be the ith block timestamp, let Wi be the time that
block i was actually created, and let i be the error in
timestamp i, so that
Xi = Wi + i. (40)
Then if the i are independent and identically distributed
with variance Var(), we would have the variance of the
timestamp inter-arrival times
Var(Xi −Xi−1) = Var(Wi+1 −Wi) + 2 Var(). (41)
Thus the timestamp errors would increase the variance.
This conclusion is true even if the variance of the errors is
not constant over time. The data cleaning (Section II-C)
reduces this effect but does not eliminate or reverse it.
If we examine Table II we see that in some intervals the
standard deviation of the timestamp inter-arrival data is
lower than that predicted by simulation, so it cannot be
entirely a result of errors in the block timestamps.
• The second explanation as to why the timestamp inter-
arrival time data has a different variance to that predicted
by the models is the effect of the block propagation delay.
Propagation delay reduces the effective global hash rate
because some time is used mining blocks which will not
be included in the long-term blockchain. However, the
difficulty adjusts to compensate for the loss of hash rate.
Small values of the delay (relative to the mean inter-
arrival time) therefore have little effect on the overall
mean, but do change the shape of the inter-arrival time
distribution. This reduces the probability that blocks have
very low inter-arrival times, so it might be expected that
it reduces the variance of the inter-arrival times, and in
fact this is what happens.
To test the effect of block propagation delay on the distri-
bution of inter-arrival times we simulate delay as in option
2 in Section IV-E, where the effective global hash rate is
(1− ec(t−s))H(t) where the most recent block was mined at
time s. We plot the effects on the mean and standard deviation
of the simulated inter-arrival times Xi −Xi−1 for a range of
values of c in Figures 10 through 14. Rather than displaying
the actual values of c on the horizontal axis we instead show
the median delay because it is more intuitive.
Figures 10 through 14 show the mean of 100 simulations
for each set of parameters. The 95% confidence intervals are
too small to be seen on the graph. The solid lines in each plot
are the simulation results. The horizontal dashed lines are the
values calculated from the observed LR resampled timestamp
data for each interval. For the simulated model to fit the real
data, the solid lines must intersect the dashed lines of the same
colour. Ideally the simulated mean and standard deviation will
intersect the observed mean and standard deviation for the
same value of the delay, that is, the intersections will line up
vertically. The dotted line is the mean block arrival interval
δ∗ = W (a)/a predicted by the steady state deterministic
approximation given in Equation (34)7. The average block
arrival interval δ∗ varies with c because a is the slope of the
line fitted to the logarithm of the estimated hash rate, and the
estimate of the hash rate depends on c (see Section VI-B).
D. Exponential hash rate, random difficulty changes with
delay
Figures 10 through 14, subfigures (a) shows what happens
when we use an exponential function and random difficulty
changes to approximate the hash rate. In all intervals except
interval 5 the observed mean is well approximated by using a
reasonable value of the block propagation delay. This model
is also consistent with the observed values of the standard
deviation in the more recent intervals 4, 5 and 6, typically
for a median block propagation delay of around 7 seconds.
However, the standard deviation of the observed inter-arrival
data in intervals 2 and 3 is much higher than that the standard
deviations of the simulated model for all values of the block
propagation delay. This could be due to the highly variable
hash rate in intervals 2 and 3 being poorly modelled by the
exponential approximation. To address this we can use a more
highly fitted, empirical hash rate function.
E. Empirical hash rate with delay
Figures 10 through 14, subfigure (c) shows what happens
when we use the empirical function HW144(t) to approximate
the hash rate, with random difficulty changes. We consider this
to be the most detailed and accurate model of those presented
here. In each interval it is clear that this model is generally
successful at matching the observed block inter-arrival time
statistics by our criterion defined above: the median delay
value at which the simulated lines intersect the measured
(“real”) values of the parameters is usually around 10 seconds
(it is lower for interval 3). Note that in most cases the true
delay is likely to be higher, due to the random errors in the
timestamp data artificially increasing the measured standard
deviation (the true dashed line would be lower, making the
solid line intersect it at a higher difficulty value).
When comparing the values of median delay inferred here
to those generated in the measurement studies [10] and [21],
the delay values mentioned in this paper are for miner-to-
miner propagation delay, rather than general node-to-node
propagation delays. Miners have a strong economic incentive
to be better connected to the Bitcoin network than a general
Bitcoin node, therefore in the present day they would be
expected to have a lower median delay.
F. Deterministic difficulty changes
Figures 10 through 14, subfigures (b) and (d) show the the
results for simulations of models with deterministic difficulty
changes. Subfigure (b) corresponds to the model with an
exponential hash rate, and subfigure (d) corresponds to the
7We plot δ∗/2016, the predicted limiting average block inter-arrival time
rather than the limiting average segment inter-arrival time in order to be
comparable to the other values on the plot.
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model with an empirical hash rate. In each case we can see
the simulated mean and standard deviation values are close
to those of the corresponding models with random difficulty
changes for low values of propagation delay, but as the
propagation delay increases the deterministic approximation
loses accuracy. For high values of the propagation delay,
the deterministic models uniformly have lower means and
standard deviations of inter-arrival times.
G. A summary of model performance and recommendations
In this subsection we consider which models and in what
circumstances they should be used. We use the notation
outlined in Section V.
1) The most accurate and successful model is 1(b) 2(b)
3(b) – empirical hash rate, random difficulty changes
and propagation delay included. We would recommend
this model whenever it is possible to closely estimate the
hash rate and accurate results are required. This is also
the most complicated model.
2) The next most accurate model is 1(a) 2(b) 3(b) – this is
the same as above, but with an exponential hash rate. This
model is accurate whenever the growth in the hash rate
is expected to be to be approximately exponential. This
would include the present day and could include a short
period into the future, so this model might be reasonable
for forecasting.
3) The simplest model that we recommend is 1(a) 2(a) 3(a) –
exponential hash rate, deterministic difficulty changes and
no propagation delay. This model is a nonhomogeneous
Poisson process where the hash rate function is periodic.
The rate increases exponentially over each segment then
instantaneously returns to its initial value at the end of
each segment. This model provides a reasonable approx-
imation to the block arrival process while still remaining
analytically tractable.
For the latter two options, if the long term block arrival rate
is all that is required it can be calculated with Equation (10)
or (35).
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented a suite of models for
the point process of block mining epochs in the Bitcoin
blockchain, and tested it with both simulation and data avail-
able from the blockchain itself. The main challenges in doing
this are:
1) the unknown global hash rate that drives the rate of block
discovery; and
2) the historically known, but random, mining difficulty
value.
Furthermore, the data on the times at which blocks arrive is
comprehensive, but not completely reliable. We postulate a
point process model in which the block arrival process behaves
as a nonhomogeneous Poisson process on times between
difficulty changes with rate proportional to the ratio of the
hash rate to the difficulty, but which is dependent on itself
when difficulty changes are taken into account. For a given
global hash rate, the times at which the difficulty changes
(and hence the block arrival rate changes) are determined by
the sample-path of the process. self-correcting. Nevertheless,
the global hash rate is consistently rapidly increasing and
the difficulty feedback mechanism is sufficiently delayed so
that the rate of block arrivals has been around 11.5% greater
than the base rate of 6 per hour8. This means that overall,
the transaction throughput and the total miner income from
bounties are higher than in the base case. Furthermore, the
times when the block mining bounty is halved and the time
when all bitcoins have been created will occur earlier than they
would have if blocks were mined at a rate of six per hour.
In addition to giving a model for the block arrival process,
we have derived the relationship between block arrival rates
and the rate of exponential increase of the hash rate. We have
also provided a practical approximation that exhibits limiting
behaviour independent of initial conditions and perturbations
of the block arrival process, and verify this approximation with
simulation and measurements from the blockchain.
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Figure 10: Interval 2. Simulating the effect of block propagation delay (seconds) on the statistics of the inter-arrival time distributions.
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Figure 11: Interval 3. Simulating the effect of block propagation delay (seconds) on the statistics of the inter-arrival time distributions.
The dashed lines indicate the values measured in the blockchain. The dotted line is the value of the mean predicted in Equation (35) by
substituting in the value of a estimated from the blockchain timestamp data.
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Figure 12: Interval 4. Simulating the effect of block propagation delay (seconds) on the statistics of the inter-arrival time distributions.
The dashed lines indicate the values measured in the blockchain. The dotted line is the value of the mean predicted in Equation (35) by
substituting in the value of a estimated from the blockchain timestamp data.
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Figure 13: Interval 5. Simulating the effect of block propagation delay (seconds) on the statistics of the inter-arrival time distributions.
The dashed lines indicate the values measured in the blockchain. The dotted line is the value of the mean predicted in Equation (35) by
substituting in the value of a estimated from the blockchain timestamp data.
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Figure 14: Interval 6. Simulating the effect of block propagation delay (seconds) on the statistics of the inter-arrival time distributions.
The dashed lines indicate the values measured in the blockchain. The dotted line is the value of the mean predicted in Equation (35) by
substituting in the value of a estimated from the blockchain timestamp data.
DR
AF
T
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF EQUATION (25)
For 1 ≤ n ≤ 2016 and a > 0
E[Xn|X0 = 0] =
∫ ∞
0
xfXn|X0=0(x) dx
=
∫ ∞
0
xeaxe−
1
a (e
ax−e0a)(
1
a
(eax − e0a))n−1 1
(n− 1)! dx
=
∫ ∞
0
xeaxe−
1
a (e
ax−1)(
1
a
(eax − 1))n−1 1
(n− 1)! dx.
Setting g(t) = eat and h(t) = exp(−(eat − 1)/a) and for n = 1, 2, . . . let
In(x) =
∫ x
∞
g(t)(g(t)− 1)n−1h(t) dt. (42)
Integration by parts gives
E[Xn|X0 = 0] = 1
(n− 1)!an−1
∫ ∞
0
xg(x)(g(x)− 1)n−1h(x) dx
=
1
(n− 1)!an−1
([
xIn(x)
]∞
0
−
∫ ∞
0
In(x) dx
)
. (43)
We proceed by finding an expression for In(x). Note first that ddxh(x) = −g(x)h(x). Once again applying integration by
parts gives (for n ≥ 2):
In(x) =
∫ x
∞
gh(g − 1)n−1 dt
= −h(g − 1)n−1 −
∫ x
∞
ag(g − 1)n−2(n− 1)(−h) dt
= −h(g − 1)n−1 + a(n− 1)In−1(x).
Combining this with I1(x) =
∫ x
∞ gh dt = −h(x) and setting the constant of integration to 0 we get (for n ≥ 1):
In(x) = −h
n−1∑
i=0
(n− 1)!
i!
an−1−i(g − 1)i. (44)
Similarly ∫ x
∞
gnh dt = −h(x)
n−1∑
i=0
(n− 1)!
i!
an−1−ig(x)i. (45)
Thus ∫ ∞
0
In(x) dx =
∫ ∞
0
−h
n−1∑
i=0
(n− 1)!
i!
an−1−i(g − 1)i dx
=
∫ ∞
0
−h
n−1∑
i=0
(n− 1)!
i!
an−1−i
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
gj(−1)i−j dx
=
n−1∑
i=0
(n− 1)!an−1−i
i∑
j=0
(−1)i+j+1
j!(i− j)!
∫ ∞
0
gjh dx
=
n−1∑
i=0
(n− 1)!an−1−i
 (−1)i+1
i!
∫ ∞
0
h dx+
i∑
j=1
(−1)i+j
j!(i− j)!
[
h
j−1∑
k=0
(j − 1)!
k!
aj−1−kgk
]∞
0

=
n−1∑
i=0
(n− 1)!an−1−i
 (−1)i
i!a
e1/aEi(−1
a
) +
i∑
j=1
(−1)i+j+1
j(i− j)!
j−1∑
k=0
aj−1−k
k!
 , (46)
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where the last line uses ∫ ∞
0
h dx =
∫ ∞
0
exp(−(eax − 1)/a) dx
=
e1/a
a
∫ ∞
1/a
e−u
u
dx = −e
1/a
a
Ei(−1
a
).
Now we can evaluate (43)
E[Xn|X0 = 0] = 1
(n− 1)!an−1
(
[xIn(x)]
∞
0 −
∫ ∞
0
In(x) dx
)
, (47)
which, via equations (44) and (46), becomes
E[Xn|X0 = 0] (48)
=
1
(n− 1)!an−1 ×
0− n−1∑
i=0
(n− 1)!an−1−i
 (−1)i
i!a
e1/aEi(−1
a
) +
i∑
j=1
(−1)i−j+1
j(i− j)!
j−1∑
k=0
aj−1−k
k!

=
n−1∑
i=0
a−i
 (−1)i+1
i!a
e1/aEi(−1
a
) +
i∑
j=1
(−1)i+j
j(i− j)!
j−1∑
k=0
aj−1−k
k!

=
n−1∑
i=0
(−a)−i
−e1/a
i!a
Ei(−1
a
) +
i∑
j=1
(−a)j
j(i− j)!
j−1∑
k=0
a−1−k
k!

=
n−1∑
i=0
(−a)−i−1
e1/a
i!
Ei(−1
a
)−
i∑
j=1
(−a)j
j(i− j)!
j−1∑
k=0
a−k
k!
 . (49)
